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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991, the Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest, a non-
profit public interest law firm, filed a lawsuit alleging that Arizona's
school finance system violated the state constitution. Although the at-
torneys working on the case were experienced and attempted to antici-
pate problems, it turns out that we had little idea of what lay in store
for us. Thirteen years and four appellate decisions later, we are still
litigating school finance issues that we thought would have been re-
solved long ago. Nevertheless, the benefits for Arizona's public schools
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
Executive Director, Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest (since 1991).
B.A. 1973, Arizona State University; J.D. 1976, University of Notre Dame Law
School. Prior to his current position, Mr. Hogan was Chief Counsel for the Ari-
zona Corporation Commission, an Assistant Attorney General, and Program Di-
rector at Community Legal Services in Phoenix, Arizona.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
that were produced by this litigation have been enormous and even
exceeded our original expectations.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest
The Arizona Center for Law in the Public Interest ("Center") was
established in 1974 as a nonprofit public interest law firm. It is a
small organization with two to four lawyers, depending on the success
of its fundraising efforts at any given time. The Center litigates issues
of statewide importance, including environmental issues, civil rights,
campaign finance, and government accountability.' In 1991, the
Center decided to include education finance among its litigation
projects.
B. School District Participation
At about the same time that the Center became interested in edu-
cation finance issues, a number of school districts in low-property-
wealth areas of Arizona approached the Center about their inability to
build new schools or renovate existing facilities. At that time, Ari-
zona's maintenance and operation system for school funding was
roughly equalized. However, capital financing was left entirely to the
ability and inclination of school districts and their voters to assess
property taxes to support the issuance of general obligation bonds.
The capital finance system had produced enormous disparities
among school districts with regard to their school facilities, which de-
pended on the size of their property tax base and the inclination of
their voters to approve tax increases. Schools in districts with low tax
bases were older, smaller, and, in some cases, unsafe for students.
Some schools lacked libraries, science labs, computer rooms, art pro-
grams, gymnasiums, and auditoriums. But in higher wealth districts,
there were schools with indoor swimming pools, a domed stadium, tel-
evision studios, and extensive computer systems. 2
The school districts that approached the Center about litigating
the constitutionality of the system were largely rural school districts
1. See e.g., ASARCO, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989), affg Kadish v. Arizona
State Land Dep't, 747 P.2d 1183 (Ariz. 1987) (holding that the State must obtain
full market value for minerals taken from federally granted school trust lands);
Ariz. Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Comp. Plans v.
Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983) (holding that women have the right to receive the
same pension benefits as men upon retirement); May v. McNally, 55 P.3d 768
(Ariz. 2002); Ariz. Ctr. for Law v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)
(holding that the public trust doctrine bars the State from relinquishing sover-
eign claims to river beds in wholesale fashion, and the State has a special duty to
protect these areas for recreation, fishing and boating).
2. Roosevelt v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 808 (Ariz. 1994).
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with small tax bases. With small tax bases, large tax increases were
necessary to support the districts' capital expenditures. As a result,
tax rates in low-wealth school districts were many times higher than
tax rates in higher wealth school districts. But high tax rates on a
small tax base still didn't generate sufficient funds to build and reno-
vate schools that were suitable for students.
C. Litigation Strategy
1. Dealing with Adverse Precedent
In 1973, in Shofstall v. Arizona,3 the Arizona Supreme Court re-
jected a school finance challenge based upon the Arizona constitu-
tional requirement that the legislature "shall provide for the
establishment and maintainence of a general and uniform public
school system."4 In a unanimous decision, the court determined that
the school finance system was general and uniform, because the laws
circumscribing that system applied equally to all school districts.
Oddly enough, the court determined that education was a fundamen-
tal right under the Arizona Constitution, but it failed to apply strict
scrutiny to its analysis of the school finance system.5
By 1991, the entire composition of the Arizona Supreme Court had
changed. Unlike the previous challenge in 1973, which generally fo-
cused on maintenance and operations funding, we determined that a
more targeted challenge, limited to the capital finance system, was
appropriate for a variety of reasons. First, it would be far easier to
demonstrate that the capital finance system produced disparities
among school districts with regard to their school buildings, facilities
and equipment. Second, it did not make sense to assert a broad-based
challenge to the school finance system, because it had been roughly
equalized after the Sho[stall decision and such a challenge would re-
quire an enormous investment of resources that the Center lacked. In
the face of the adverse decision from 1973, we determined that a lim-
ited challenge requiring fewer resources, but one that would clearly
demonstrate the stark differences in school facilities was the optimal
strategy.
2. Parties and Resources
At the very beginning, perhaps a half-dozen school districts had
approached the Center about litigating capital finance issues. We
made an effort to recruit additional school districts for both financial
and political reasons. Arizona has approximately 228 school districts,
ranging from less than fifty students in the smallest district to 70,000
3. 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973).
4. ARIz. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
5. See Shofstall, 515 P.2d 590.
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students in the largest.6 We wanted to be able to represent to the
court that the litigation was supported by a substantial number of
school districts. Additionally, even though we hoped that the litiga-
tion would be relatively inexpensive, we wanted to insure that we had
sufficient financial resources to pay for what might turn out to be sub-
stantial costs. The more school districts we could recruit to support
the litigation, the less of a financial burden it would be for each school
district.
By the time we filed the lawsuit in 1991, we had enlisted the sup-
port of over forty school districts, each of which executed intergovern-
mental agreements to support the litigation. Additionally, the school
districts agreed to assess themselves on a per-student basis to gener-
ate the funds that we anticipated would be necessary to finance the
litigation.
III. THE LITIGATION
A. The Trial Court
From among the forty or so school districts supporting the litiga-
tion, we identified four districts to serve as plaintiffs in the case. The
complaint filed on behalf of those districts generally alleged that the
school finance system was unconstitutional because it was not "gen-
eral and uniform" and because it denied equal protection of the laws.
Other lawyers represented a class of parents in the affected school
districts.
We spent the next year assembling evidence to support a motion
for summary judgment. We collected affidavits from the superintend-
ents of the plaintiff school districts detailing the condition of their
buildings, facilities, and equipment. We also retained a consultant to
inspect higher property-wealth school districts and provide an exten-
sive affidavit about conditions in those districts. We worked with ex-
perts to submit a lengthy affidavit about minimum facility standards
that should be maintained in school districts to support an adequate
learning environment. Finally, we took depositions of state education
officials regarding the conditions in low-property-wealth school dis-
tricts and the manner in which the school finance system was respon-
sible for producing those conditions.
By the time we were done, we had approximately 2,000 pages of
exhibits to support the motion for summary judgment that we filed.
The effort was so comprehensive that the State did not attempt to re-
but any of our factual assertions. Instead, the State alleged that it
6. DEP'T OF EDUC., STATE OF ARIZ., ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION ANNUAL
FINANCIAL REPORT FOR FIscAL YEAR 2002-2003: EXPENDITURES By FUND FOR Dis-
TRICTS, at www.ade.az.gov/annualreport/annualreport2003/PerPupilExpendi-
tures/ExpendituresByFundDistrict.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
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lacked the resources to determine whether they were true and filed a
motion to dismiss the case based on the Shofstall decision of twenty
years earlier.
The trial court judge, feeling constrained by the decision in Shof-
stall, ruled that the school finance system was constitutional.
7 How-
ever, in so doing, the judge did us a great favor by additionally finding
that there were "gross disparities" in school buildings and facilities
among school districts and that the disparities were caused by the Ari-
zona school finance system. Judgment was entered for the State and
we appealed.
B. The Arizona Supreme Court
We requested that the supreme court accept the case directly from
the trial court, avoiding the need to have the case heard in the inter-
mediate appellate court. The Arizona Supreme Court heard argument
in November 1993, and issued its decision in July 1994.8
The decision was close, with a razor-thin margin voting to hold
that the school capital financing system was unconstitutional. Two
justices subscribed to an opinion that held that the system was not
"general and uniform" based on what appeared at the time to be eq-
uity grounds.9 The third justice issued a concurring opinion that
agreed with much of the plurality opinion but interpreted the "general
and uniform" provision as imposing a minimum adequacy require-
ment.' 0 The two remaining justices dissented on the grounds that ed-
ucation issues were nonjusticiable under the Arizona Constitution."
Our strategy had worked perfectly. We had secured a supreme
court victory, overcoming adverse precedent, with relatively modest
amounts of time and money invested. We had avoided an expensive
and time-consuming trial, submitted an overwhelmingly favorable fac-
tual record, and persuaded a slim majority of the Arizona Supreme
Court to declare the school finance system unconstitutional.
Our luck was about to change.
IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
While we were not naive, we did not fully appreciate the problems
we would encounter in enforcing the supreme court's decision. For one
thing, the supreme court had merely directed that a declaratory judg-
ment be issued in favor of the plaintiffs, but it declined to issue any
7. Order, Roosevelt (Maricopa County, Ariz. Super. Ct. Sept. 18, 1992) (No. CV91-
13087).
8. Roosevelt v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994).
9. Id. at 814-15.
10. Id. at 822 (Feldman, C.J., specially concurring).
11. Id. at 827 (Moeller, V.C.J., dissenting, joined by Corcoran, J.).
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injunctive relief, based on the presumption that state legislators
would surely enact responsive legislation in a timely manner. The su-
preme court required action within a reasonable period of time, but it
failed to give a specific deadline.
The next four years were exceedingly difficult for both us and the
school districts. We bounced back and forth between the legislature
and the courts in an effort to get legislation enacted that complied
with the supreme court's decision. Our clearly identified goal of sup-
porting any school finance plan that complied with the constitutional
mandate served us well through those difficult periods. However, we
were also at odds with individuals and groups who would ordinarily be
considered allies of public education. Perhaps most significantly, we
learned that party affiliation often does not mean much in the context
of school finance and that what is more important is the specific situa-
tion of school districts located within a legislator's district. We had
heard the maxim that all politics is local, but we never fully under-
stood it until we went through the legislative experience.
A. Initial Legislative Response
We knew we were in for a difficult time when on the day that the
supreme court decision was announced, the President of the Arizona
State Senate (a lawyer) said that the supreme court could decide
whatever it wants, but making the legislature comply with the deci-
sion was another matter altogether. He understood that Arizona has
a strong separation of powers doctrine that is expressly stated in Ari-
zona's Constitution.12 He also understood that the legislature had
been dismissed early on as a defendant in the case based on that doc-
trine, and that, as a nonparty, the legislature could not be the direct
subject of any compliance actions by the plaintiffs.13
We began to appreciate the problem as well and decided to retain
the services of experienced lobbyists to make our case for us at the
legislature. We specifically chose lobbyists who were members of the
same political party as the majority of legislators and the Governor. It
was our hope that in so doing we would enjoy greater access to legisla-
tors than we would otherwise. What we did not realize was that ac-
cess to legislators is not very helpful when they have already made up
their minds.
The supreme court's decision was issued in July, after the conclu-
sion of the 1994 legislative session. 14 We developed a proposal to ad-
dress the court's decision that would have equalized capital
12. ARiz. CONST. art. III.
13. Order, Roosevelt (Maricopa County, Ariz. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1991) (No. CV91-
13087).
14. Roosevelt, 877 P.2d 806 (filed July 21, 1994).
874 [Vol. 83:869
ARIZONA SCHOOL FINANCE
expenditures on the same basis that maintenance and operation ex-
penses had already been equalized in Arizona, and submitted the pro-
posal to the legislature for its consideration after it reconvened in
January 1995.15
At the same time, other individuals, groups and legislators were
busy preparing their own proposals for consideration. Committees
were formed and summits were held, but by the end of 1995 nothing
had happened. It was now a year-and-a-half since the court had is-
sued its decision, and we decided we could not let another legislative
session go by without legislative action addressing its decision.
In late 1995, we filed a motion with the trial court detailing the
legislature's inaction and requesting that the trial court establish a
deadline for compliance. 16 We also requested that the trial court en-
join the operation of the school finance system if the legislature failed
to meet the established deadline. That was one of the more difficult
decisions we had to make, because it meant that school districts them-
selves were asking that the public schools be closed if the legislature
failed to comply. We knew that there would be questions about how
educators could support such action, but in the face of legislative delay
and inaction, we really had no choice.
The trial court denied our motion in January 1996, because we had
not offered proof concerning what constituted a reasonable time for
legislative action.17 Following that ruling, the legislature finally took
some action in March 1996. Legislation was passed that appropriated
$30 million to address critical capital deficiencies and established a
board to mete out the money based on applications for funding submit-
ted by school districts, with priority given to health and safety
needs.' 8 After passing the legislation, the legislature and Governor
declared that they had complied with the supreme court decision and
that the problems with the school capital finance system had been
addressed.
We disagreed. A single appropriation that would only address crit-
ical needs failed to change the system that had produced "gross dis-
parities" among school capital facilities across the state. We went
back to the trial court and alleged that the new legislation failed to
comply with the supreme court decision. At the same time, we re-
quested that the trial court establish a deadline and enjoin operation
15. Plaintiffs' Motion for Further Relief at 6 exh.D, Roosevelt (Maricopa County, Ariz.
Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 1995) (No. CV91-13087).
16. Plainfiffs' Motion for Further Relief, Roosevelt (Maricopa County, Ariz. Super. Ct.
Dec. 14, 1995) (No. CV91-13087).
17. Order Roosevelt (Maricopa County, Ariz. Super. Ct. Jan. 30, 1996) (No. CV91-
13087).
18. H.B. 2009, 42d Leg., 5th Spec. Sess., 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 8.
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of the school finance system if compliance was not achieved by the
time set by the court.
In November 1996, the trial court agreed and gave the legislature
one budget cycle to comply or face a shutdown of the public schools on
June 30, 1998.19 The Governor, who had previously intervened, ap-
pealed that ruling to the state supreme court, which, in January 1997,
affirmed the trial court without elaboration. 20
B. The Legislature Gets More Sophisticated
Understanding that it at least had to make the pretense of chang-
ing the school finance system, the legislature enacted new legislation
in 1997, which was dubbed "Assistance to Build Classrooms"
("ABC").21 This legislation slightly increased the amount of funding
that had been appropriated in the previous legislation and used it to
establish a revenue stream to school districts to support the issuance
of revenue bonds. The legislation purported to reduce the disparity in
the capital funding capacity of school districts to a ratio of four-to-one.
Under the ABC legislation, low-wealth school districts would still
have to issue debt to build or renovate schools, but the State would
provide some assistance. Even so, the tax effort required in low-
wealth school districts to build or renovate schools would still be sub-
stantially greater than in higher property-wealth school districts.
Higher wealth school districts supported the ABC legislation, but
the districts we were representing objected to it on numerous grounds,
including that it preserved large disparities in the school finance sys-
tem and contained no standards by which to determine the adequacy
of school buildings and facilities. Once again we returned to the trial
court, which ruled in our favor, and once again the Governor appealed.
On appeal to the supreme court, a number of state legislators filed
an amicus brief requesting the court to be more specific about what
the legislature needed to do to satisfy the constitutional mandate. Ap-
parently the legislature had never heard the admonition that you
should be careful what you ask for.
The supreme court upheld the trial court's decision and acceded to
the legislators' request to be more specific about the requirements for
a "general and uniform" public school system. 22 The court held that
the State must establish minimum adequacy standards for school
buildings, facilities and equipment; bring all existing facilities up to
those standards; and then keep them there.23
19. Order, Roosevelt (Maricopa County, Ariz. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1996) (No. CV91-
13087).
20. Order, Roosevelt (Ariz. Jan. 15, 1997) (No. CV96-0614-SA).
21. H.B. 2119, 43d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1997 Airz. Sess. Laws ch. 4.
22. Hull v. Albrecht, 950 P.2d 1141 (Ariz. 1997).
23. Hull v. Albrecht, 960 P.2d 634 (Ariz. 1998).
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Although it may not have been exactly what the legislature wanted
to hear, the legislature soon enacted a new school finance system that
complied with the court's prescription-at least for those school dis-
tricts that wanted to participate in it.
C. The Opt-Out System
During the legislative session in early 1998, the legislature took
another shot at complying with the supreme court's decisions. 24 Leg-
islation was proposed that would establish minimum building and fa-
cility standards and provide funding to renovate and replace school
buildings that failed to meet the standards.2 5 Additionally, a formula
would be used to determine appropriations for the construction of new
schools and the maintenance of existing facilities.
2 6
It sounded great, but there was a catch. The legislature was still
listening to high-wealth school districts and school associations that
feared that the new legislation would impair "local control." As a re-
sult, the legislature decided to include a provision that school districts
that did not want to participate in the new system could continue to
rely on their tax base to finance school construction and renovation.
27
School districts that chose to participate in the new system, on the
other hand, would be prohibited from issuing debt to exceed the mini-
mum adequacy standards.
As a consequence of the opt-out provision, two separate and un-
equal school finance systems would be created by the legislation. Low-
wealth school districts would have to participate in the new system,
because they would have no other means by which to construct and
renovate their schools. However, higher wealth school districts would
be able to opt out of the proposed system and continue to build schools
that exceeded the minimum state standards.
The legislation was hotly contested. The plaintiff school districts
opposed it because it would forever consign them to second-class sta-
tus. Higher wealth school districts that benefited from the property
tax based system supported the legislation, because it preserved
largely intact the old system that had worked for them.
The final vote was close. In casting the deciding vote in favor of the
opt-out legislation, a legislative member from one of the higher wealth
school districts made a tearful speech about how horrible and unfair
the new legislation was, but how she felt constrained to vote for it.
This time the Governor directly petitioned the supreme court to
bless the new legislation. We opposed, arguing that the new legisla-
24. S.B. 1002, 43d Leg., 3d Spec. Sess., 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 1.
25. Id. ch. 1, § 44 (adding ARiz. REV. STAT. § 15-2011).
26. Id. ch. 1, § 44 (adding ARiz. REV. STAT. §§ 15-2002, -2021, -2031, -2041).
27. Id. ch. 1, § 7 (adding ARIz. REV. STAT. § 15-341(A)(31)).
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tion created not one but two school finance systems: one for the rich
and one for the poor. Our contention was that the new legislation
would ensure the existence of disparities, because low-wealth school
districts that had no choice but to participate in the new system would
be prohibited from ever exceeding the minimum standards, while
higher wealth school districts could exceed the minimum standards at
will.
In a dramatic decision entered in June 1998, the Arizona Supreme
Court unanimously agreed with us and rejected the new legislation. 28
The court extended the trial court's previously issued injunction for
another sixty days to allow the legislature to act before the school fi-
nance system was enjoined for noncompliance. Many in the legisla-
ture railed against the court for what they regarded as an
unwarranted intrusion into legislative affairs. At the same time, it
was an election year and the only way the Governor was going to lose
the election was if the schools were shut down in August. In short
order, she convened a special session of the legislature, which
promptly enacted the Students FIRST (Fair and Immediate Resources
for Students Today)29 legislation which preserved many of the core
elements from the previous legislation, but required all school dis-
tricts to participate.
It is impossible to ignore the irony associated with the enactment
of the Students FIRST legislation in 1998. The Arizona Legislature is
conservative and generally recoils at the idea of bigger government.
The last thing in the world that it would have wanted to do in 1994
was to create a massive new system in which the State was exclu-
sively responsible for financing the repair and renovation of existing
schools and the construction of new schools without any contribution
whatsoever from local school districts. But that is exactly what
happened.
The legislation created a new state agency, the School Facilities
Board ("SFB") that is responsible for establishing minimum adequacy
standards and overseeing operation of the new system. 30 Students
FIRST also required that the State assess each and every school build-
ing to determine whether it met the minimum standards and, if not, to
make the necessary repairs. That ended up costing a total of $1.3 bil-
lion by the end of 2004.
The State is now responsible for funding new school construction
up to the minimum adequacy standards as well as providing an an-
nual distribution of building renewal funds to maintain existing facili-
ties. If fully funded, that amounts to at least $350 million annually.
28. Hull, 960 P.2d 634.
29. S.B. 1001, 43d Leg., 5th Spec. Sess., 1998 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 1.
30. Id. ch. 1, § 39 (adding Aaiz. REV. STAT. § 15-2001).
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All told, the State has spent approximately $3 billion on school build-
ings and facilities since 1996.
V. THE POLITICS OF EDUCATION FINANCE
The school finance debate may have gotten started in the courts,
but it spread quickly and often uncontrollably to the executive and
legislative branches. And, to be sure, there was a tension between
those two branches and the judiciary on the issue. Whenever that
kind of tension exists, the issue is certain to attract the media, and
when schools are involved, the effect is compounded.
As I said at the outset, while we were experienced, our experience
did not prepare us for navigating the legislative process. That is why
we hired lobbyists to represent our clients at the legislature. After a
couple of years, it became apparent that regardless of lobbyists' party
affiliation or experience, they can only be effective when legislators
have an open mind. In this case, lines were quickly drawn and minds
just as quickly shut because of what many legislators viewed as an
intrusion by the judiciary on what, until then, had been regarded
solely as legislative turf.
Once we came to the realization that our lobbyists, though talented
and well-meaning, were not going to be able to achieve the results
sought, we terminated their contracts. I assumed those responsibili-
ties and soon, along with two superintendents, became a spokesperson
for our client group.
By that time, the number of school districts participating in our
group had swelled to over seventy. While there was value in repre-
senting close to a third of Arizona's school districts, it also led to cum-
bersome and sometimes difficult decisionmaking. Decisions often had
to be made on the spur of the moment, because legislators and other
elected officials would routinely issue plans to much fanfare. When
that occurred, the media expected an instantaneous response from the
plaintiffs.
The plaintiff school districts and their counsel were steadfast in
their adherence to the principle that we would support any plan that
complied with the constitutional mandate, regardless of who spon-
sored it. Sometimes that meant supporting elected officials with
whom we did not otherwise agree on a variety of other school-related
issues. When that happened, we were separated from traditional edu-
cation groups and allies in the legislature. But we understood that
any deviation from that overarching principle would spell doom for us
in the legislature and the courts.
The pitched battle between the Governor and the legislature on the
one hand, and the court on the other, became so accentuated that the
Governor used the school finance issue as a litmus test for new judges.
One judicial candidate at the time told me that the very first question
2005]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the Governor asked in the interview concerned the court's school fi-
nance opinion. Likewise, there was a seething undercurrent in the
legislature that many of them would not be wasting their time on
school buildings if they were not being coerced by the courts.
There was even conflict within the Executive Branch. The Gover-
nor intervened, because he did not believe the named defendant-the
Superintendent of Public Instruction-was adequately representing
the State's interests. The Superintendent was herself an elected offi-
cial and a member of the same political party as the Governor. To her
credit, she generally agreed with us regarding the legislature's unwill-
ingness to comply with the court's decisions, leading to a very public
dispute with the Governor.
We had one major advantage that the other participants in the de-
bate lacked. We spoke with one single and assertive voice and we did
not have much to lose. When any new plan was proposed at the legis-
lature, we could support or oppose it without worrying about how our
position might affect other legislative issues. Likewise, when the leg-
islature took action that we deemed insufficient, we faced little risk
when we challenged it. It was not as if we were going to end up worse
off than we were prior to the legislative action.
VI. THE STATE OF SCHOOL FINANCE IN ARIZONA TODAY
When Students FIRST was enacted in 1998, the state treasury was
flush with cash. That fact, combined with conservatives' traditional
aversion to debt, meant that at least initially, Students FIRST was
entirely paid for with cash out of the State's general fund. We knew
the day would come when the economy soured, and that day came
sooner than we thought it would. Over the last several years, with
budget deficits instead of surpluses, the State has reduced Students
FIRST funding, forcing us to return to court. 3 1 Litigation over fund-
ing issues continues, and, at the same time, pressure has increased to
explore other ways of funding Students FIRST. That search contin-
ues, but because the budget deficit crisis appears to have abated, al-
ternative financing schemes are now proposed far less frequently.
In 1991, when we filed the first lawsuit, one of our motivations was
to establish new precedent upon which to build a challenge to Ari-
zona's maintenance and operation funding system. We filed that law-
suit in 2001, asserting that the funding system was unconstitutional
because it failed to provide the programs and funding at-risk students
need in order to achieve the State's academic standards. It is difficult
to surprise me anymore, but I was surprised when the trial court
judge dismissed the 2001 lawsuit, holding that the separation of pow-
31. Roosevelt v. State, 74 P.3d 258 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).
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ers doctrine prevents the judiciary from becoming involved. 3 2 The
case is now on appeal, and I have an overwhelming sense of-you
guessed it-d6jk vu all over again.
VII. CONCLUSION
I suppose the lesson from all this is that school finance work is
never truly done. As long as there are social and economic inequities,
there will be school finance inequities. For a public interest lawyer
like myself, that is not news. But for other lawyers who are new to the
world of school finance, you can dispense with the idea that there is a
beginning and end to these cases. You will forget the beginning; the
end may never come into clear view.
That does not mean that the cases are not worth the enormous ef-
fort they take. On a personal and professional level, I have had no
greater satisfaction than traveling around this state and seeing the
hundreds of new and renovated schools in poor communities and
knowing that our work helped build them.
32. Order, Crane Elementary Sch. Dist. v. State of Arizona (Maricopa County, Ariz.
Super. Ct. Nov. 25, 2003) (No. CV2001-016305), appeal pending, No. 1 CA-CV 04-
0076 (Ariz. Ct. App.).
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